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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
CHRYSLER CREDIT CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GILBERT E. BURNS, 
Defendant, Third-Party 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendant 
and Respondent. 
Number 14640 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This was an action for repossession and sale of a 
certain recreational trailer, and for attorney fees and 
deficiency judgment. Defendant, Third-Party Plaintiff and 
Appellant GILBERT E. BURNS answered the Complaint, and cross-
claimed against Third-Party Defendant and Respondent U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY claiming breach of warranty, and thereafter 
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sought statutory damages for failure of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY 
to follow mandatory procedures in the repossession and sale 
of the recreational trailer. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND 
IN PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS BEFORE 
THE SUPREME COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable J. Harlan 
Burns, sitting without a jury. Judgment was entered in favor 
of Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant BURNS, and against 
Third-Party Defendant/Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY. U. & S 
MOTOR COMPANY appealed to the Supreme Court, which reversed and 
remanded, with instructions to the lower court to sell the 
recreational trailer, to determine the amount of deficiency, 
if any, and to determine attorney fees and costs. In the lower 
court, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY sought a deficiency judgment and 
attorney fees, while GILBERT E. BURNS sought statutory damages 
based upon failure of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY to follow mandatory 
procedures inAthe repossession and sale of the trailer. The 
lower court entered judgment denying the award of a deficiency 
to U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, but awarded attorney fees in the 
amount of $473.13. The lower court's judgment also denied 
GILBERT E. BURNS an award of statutory damages. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff/Appellant GILBERT E. 
BURNS seeks to have the judgment of the trial court reversed 
and remanded insofar as the award of attorney fees to Respondei 
and the denial of statutory damages to Appellant are concerned 
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with instructions to the trial court to enter judgment deny-
ing Respondent any attorney fees, and awarding Appellant 
statutory damages in the amount of $1,457.56. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On 12 October 1971, Appellant BURNS was medically 
retired from the service by reason of chronic emphysema and 
other physical disabilities which made him unfit for active duty. 
Upon being discharged, Mr. BURNS flew directly to Cedar City, 
Utah, to be with his brother who could care for him, since Mr. 
BURNS was so weak and disabled as to be unable to tie his own 
shoes (Transcript, page 14). Finding quarters cramped and 
needing a place in which to live permanently, Mr. BURNS 
approached Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY (Transcript, page 15). 
On or about 19 October 1971, Appellant BURNS informed 
one Scott Urie, employee and agent of U. & S. MOTORS, concerning 
a vehicle which could be used by Appellant as a permanent 
residence. Appellant informed U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY of his 
needs, and was assured that the recreational trailer subsequently 
purchased would meet Mr. BURNS' needs for a permanent place of 
residence (Transcript, pages 20-21). On the same day, Appellant 
purchased the recreational trailer in the firm belief, based 
upon the assurances of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S agent, Urie, 
that the vehicle would serve as a permanent home, and took the 
trailer from the sales lot. Later, on 28 October 1971, Mr. 
BURNS signed the Retail Installment Contract provided by U. & S. 
MOTORS, which covered the sale of the trailer (Exhibit #1). 
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Immediately upon taking possession of the trailer, 
Mr. BURNS attempted to establish it as a permanent home struc-
ture, but began to experience innumerable difficulties generall 
inherent in the design of the unit, which, rather than being 
suitable for permanent residence as had been stated by U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY, was a unit specifically designed for mobile, 
highway use, and for short periods of temporary occupancy 
(Memorandum Decision, page 2). 
Among other things, toilet and plumbing facilities 
of the trailer were constantly in a non-functional state. At 
trial, U. & S. MOTOR1s agent testified that in order for the 
plumbing facilities to function properly, the unit had to be 
moved frequently, since road action was necessary to keep soli< 
broken up. Lighting fixtures and wiring were adequate only foi 
auxiliary use. Rodents and insects were able to penetrate the 
trailer at will (Memorandum Decision, pages 2-3). Lights and 
wiring crumbled, melted, and smoked (Transcript, pages 27-31). 
Shorts in the wiring caused the trailer shell itself to be 
electrified, causing shocks to Mr. BURNS and his pet (Transcri] 
page 35). A vent on the top of the trailer leaked (Transcript 
page 36). The furnace wouldn't function properly in cold 
weather (Transcript, pages 36-37). 
Appellant BURNS many times attempted to get U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY to remedy the defects, with only a perfunctory 
response. In November of 1971, Mr. BURNS moved out of the 
trailer, due to the stink and general difficulties inherent in 
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the trailer (Transcript, pages 37-38). In an effort to get 
the problems corrected, Mr. BURNS discontinued payments on 
the vehicle, and this action was filed on 25 January 1973 to 
repossess the trailer and collect money alleged to be owed by 
Mr. BURNS. BURNS cross-claimed against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, 
and at trial, the lower court determined that U. & S. MOTOR 
COMPANY had breached its warranty that the trailer was fit for 
use as a stationary house trailer, rescinded the dontract of 
purchase, and gave judgment to Appellant BURNS in the amount 
of $2,388.81, with interest and costs, but subject to an off-
set in favor of Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in the amount 
of $883.47 (Memorandum Decision; Conclusions of Law). 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY appealed. This Court found 
that any warranty of fitness had been disclaimed in writing, 
and reversed and remanded, with instructions to the trial court 
to determine any deficiency, and to determine any award of 
attorney fees and costs (Remittitur, and Opinion), 
The recreational trailer was subsequently repossessed 
by U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, reconditioned, and sold, but not pur-
suant to any order of the lower court (Affidavit of Scott M. 
Urie). No written notice of the time, date, place and manner 
of sale of the trailer was aver given to Mr. BURNS (Judgment 
dated 17 May 1976, and Affidavit of BURNS dated 6 September 1975). 
Had Appellant BURNS been given such notice, he would have taken 
every step available to protect his rights in the trailer (Affi-
davit of Mr. BURNS dated 6 September 1975). On 21 April 1975, 
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U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY moved that the lower court grant judgment 
against Mr. BUMS for a claimed deficiency of $517.00, claimed 
attorney fees of $1,500.00, costs, and other relief (Motion, 
dated 18 April 1975). On or about 20 August 1975, U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY supported its Motion with the Affidavit of Scott 
M. Urie, alleging a deficiency of $517.00, but providing no 
accounting of the amount received for the trailer, or of the 
amounts expended in retaking the vehicle, storing, recondition-
ing, and selling it, if any. Also on or about 20 August 1975, 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S counsel filed the Affidavit of Michael 
W. Park, setting forth that a reasonable attorney fee was the 
amount of $473.13, not $1,500.00 as claimed in the Motion. 
On 8 September 1975, Mr. BURNS' Affidavit Supporting 
Continuation of Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposi-
tion to U. & S. Motor Company's Motion for Deficiency Judgment 
and Attorney Fees was filed, and on 1 October 1975, Mr. BURNS 
filed a Motion for Relief in the Form of Judgment, seeking 
judgment against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in the amount of $1,457 
based upon U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY'S failure to follow mandatory 
procedure in the repossession and sale of the trailer. The 
lower court took both motions under advisement, and on 17 May 
1976, signed the Judgment denying Respondent any deficiency, 
awarded Respondent $473.13 as .attorney fees, and denied Appell 
BURNS judgment in the amount of $1,457.56, even though the cou 
specifically found that no written notice of the time, date, 
place and manner of sale of the repossessed trailer was ever 
-6-
mailed or given to Appellant BURNS (Judgment, dated 17 May 
1976). From this Judgment, Mr. BURNS appealed those portions 
granting U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY $473.13 as attorney fees, and 
denying Appellant judgment against U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY in 
the amount of $1,457.56. Respondent U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY did 
not appeal that portion of the Judgment denying a deficiency 
judgment against Appellant BURNS. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
WHEN IT AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES TO U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY FOR THE REASON THAT U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY FAILED TO COMPLY WITH MAN-
DATORY PROVISIONS OF LAW IN THE REPOSSES-
SION AND SALE OF THE TRAILER, AND FAILED 
TO PROPERLY APPLY THE PROCEEDS OF SUCH SALE. 
It is abundantly clear from the record that Respondent 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY did not send notice of the method, date, 
time, place and manner of sale to Appellant BURNS, nor was a 
detailed accounting of the proceeds of the sale ever provided. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate to whom the sale was 
made, and the circumstances of this case from start to finish 
give rise to a certain skepticism as to the propriety of the 
actions of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY and its agents. Therefore, 
the lower court's award of attorney fees should be reversed, 
for the following reasons: 
a. U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is and 
was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the reason 
that it failed to send notice of the time, place, and manner of 
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sale to Appellant. The lower court specifically found that 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY failed to send notice of the time, date, 
place and manner of the sale of the repossessed trailer to 
Appellant BURNS. This failure, especially where proceeds of 
the sale have been misapplied, as set forth in paragraph "c" 
below, and where the sale was commercially unreasonable, as 
shown in "b" below, requires that the award of attorney fees 
be reversed. 
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) provides for notice to be given 
by a foreclosing seller to the debtor. The law states: 
"Unless collateral is perishable or threatens 
to decline speedily in value or is of a type 
customarily sold on a recognized market, 
reasonable notification of the time and place 
of any public sale or reasonable notification 
of the time after which any private sale or 
other intended disposition is to be made shall 
be sent by the secured party to the debtor™ 
(Emphasis supplied). 
Language of the statute is in the mandatory mode. The collates 
in this case was a trailer house, definitely not the sort of 
collateral which is perishable or which threatens to decline 
speedily in value, as might fruit or vegetables. In addition, 
a repossessed Roadrunner trailer house is not the type of 
collateral customarily sold on a recognized market. See 
Community Management Association v. Tousley, 505 P.2d 1314 
(Colo.App.). There simply does not exist a recognized market 
for the sale of repossessed Roadrunner trailers.. Since the 
collateral was not perishable, did not threaten to decline 
speedily in value, and is not the type customarily sold on a 
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recognized market, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was required to 
send notice of the disposition to Appellant BURNS. This it 
failed to do. 
U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY does not contest the fact that 
it did not send notification to Mr. BURNS, but only argues that 
the results of the previous appeal to this Court were such 
notification required by the statute. There is no merit to 
Respondent's contention for the reason that the notice required 
is notice of the time and place of sale, and whether public 
sale is involved, or private sale or other disposition. The 
order of this Court on the previous appeal was that: 
11
 . . . the judgment of the District Court 
herein be, and the same is, reversed and 
remanded with directions to order a sale 
of the trailer . ! ". " (Remittitur, emphasis 
added). 
The record shows no such order of the District Court requiring 
the sale of the trailer, and Respondent is therefore not only 
in violation of the statutory law concerning repossession and 
sale of collateral, but is in direct violation of the law of 
this case, since, pursuant to the above, the sale was only to 
be conducted by order of the District Court. No judicial sale 
ever occurred. Obviously, had such a sale been ordered, 
'Appellant BURNS would have b.een protected, in that he would 
undoubtedly have received notice from the District Court of 
the time, place, and manner of the proposed sale, and in that 
he would have had opportunity to exercise his statutory right 
of redemption, granted by U.C.A. 70A-9-506 (1953, as amended), 
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prior to any such sale. Having violated the terms of the 
earlier remand, Respondent cannot claim that the same was the 
notice to Respondent required by the statute. We must presume 
that the order contained in the Remittitur meant that the sale 
was to be conducted according to law, and Respondent has 
violated both statutory law and the law of this case as to the 
sale of the trailer. The failure to follow the law voided 
any right of U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY to attorney fees or to a 
deficiency judgment. The Respondent cannot rely on the pre-
vious opinion of this Court to cover its egregious errors in 
failing to follow the law covering disposition of collateral. 
As a matter of fact, it is impossible to determine from the 
record just when the sale took place, and it is thoroughly 
possible that it occurred prior to the date of the Remittitur 
of this Court, or to a friend, employee, or relative of Mr. 
Urie, or to Respondent itself, at a sacrifice price. The fail-
ure to supply details of the time, place, and manner of sale, 
and the failure to provide a proper accounting, justifiably 
arouses suspicion. 
Where a creditor does not strictly comply with the 
notice provisions of U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) (1953, as amended), 
the proper remedy is to deny him an award of attorney fees, 
especially where such an award takes the nature of a deficiency 
judgment after the seller has improperly applied the proceeds 
received from the sale, which proceeds should have been applied 
to the payment of attorney fees prior to the satisfaction of 
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( 
indebtedness. Had the proceeds been properly applied, the 
question in the lower court would have been one as to the 
propriety of awarding a deficiency judgment where no notice 
was given to the debtor, which question was decided favorably 
to Appellant, and which Respondent did not appeal. The law 
in this case, therefore, is that failure to give proper notice 
bars an action for a deficiency judgment. For other cases in 
which a deficiency judgment was denied for failure to give 
notice, see Aimonetto v. Keepes, 501 P.2d 1017 (Wyo.); Alliance 
Discount Corporation v. Shaw, 195 Pa.Super. 601, 171 A.2d 548; 
Skeels v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corporation, 222 F.Supp. 696 
(D.C.Pa.), vac. other grounds, 335 F.2d 846 (CA 3rd); Brasswell 
v. American National Bank, 117 Ga.App. 699, 161 S.E.2d 420; 
Tauber v. Johnson, 8 Ill.App.3d 789, 291 N.E.2d 180; and Leasco 
Data Processing Equipment Corporation v. Atlas Shirt Company, 
66 Misc.2d 1089, 323 NYS2d 13. 
In all fairness, it must be admitted that there is 
a minority position which would permit the award of a deficiency 
under certain circumstances, even though the seller failed to 
give the required notice. Community Management, supra. The 
better and majority rule, however, is to deny it, for the 
reason that failure to give the required notice unjustly 
deprives the debtor of his right to redeem the collateral, 
which right is afforded to him by U.C.A. 70A-9-506 (1953, as 
amended). It is clear from the record that Mr. BURNS would have 
taken every step available to protect his interests in the 
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collateral had he been given notice. 
b. U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is not 
and was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the rea-
son that it has failed to make a showing that the repossession 
sale was commercially reasonable, and said sale was commercially 
unreasonable. The record of this case clearly shows that 
GILBERT E. BURNS bought the trailer for his own personal and 
household use, and that U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was a merchant 
with respect to the goods sold, held a security interest in the 
trailer, and sought to foreclose the same. The Utah Uniform 
Commercial Code applies, as determined by this Court on the pre-
vious appeal. 
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(3) requires that: 
11
 . . . every aspect of the disposition, includ-
ing the method, manner, time, place and terms, 
must be commercially reasonable." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The burden of establishing the reasonableness of the 
disposition is upon the secured party. See Vic Hansen & Sons, 
Inc. v. Crowley, 57 Wis.2d 106, 203 N.W.2d 728, 59 A.L.R.3d 369 
In this case, where a secret sale was made, where no notice of 
the method, manner, time, place and terms of the sale was 
given to Appellant, and where Respondent claims to have recon-
ditioned the trailer, but gave no accounting of any expenses 
of retaking, holding, preparing for sale, selling, and the like 
to Appellant, the sale was clearly commercially unreasonable. 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the award of attorney 
fees, and deny the same to Respondent. 
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c. U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY, as a matter of law, is 
not and was not entitled to an award of attorney fees for the 
reason that the proceeds of the repossession sale were not 
applied according to law. It is undisputed that after having 
repossessed the trailer, U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY sold the same, 
and the entire proceeds of the sale, whether the sale was 
public or private, were applied to partial satisfaction of 
the principal amount owed by Appellant to Respondent. Such 
application was improper, and not authorized by Utah law. 
U.C.A. 70A-9-504(l) (1953, as amended) states in part: 
"The proceeds of disposition shall be applied 
in the order following to (a) the reasonable 
expenses of retaking, holding, preparing for 
sale, selling, leasing and the like and, to the 
extent not prohibited by law, the reasonable 
attorneyfs fees and legal expenses incurred by 
the secured party; (b) the satisfaction of 
indebtedness secured . . . " (Emphasis added) . 
The wording of the statute is mandatory. The Affidavit 
of Scott M. Urie shows conclusively that the proceeds from the 
sale of the trailer were not applied in accordance with law. 
The amount owing by Mr. BURNS to U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY was 
$3,155.25 (Transcript, page 9, lines 23-25). U. & S. MOTOR 
COMPANY claimed a deficiency of $517.00 and attorney fees of 
$473.13. Simple subtraction shows that at least $2,638.25 of 
the proceeds were applied to satisfaction of indebtedness. 
Such an amount would have been more than enough to satisfy 
the claimed attorney fee of $473.13, had it been taken from 
the proceeds, but having chosen to apply such amount to the 
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indebtedness rather than attorney fees, Respondent cannot now 
be heard to claim attorney fees. Attorney fees, in cases such 
as this, can only come from the proceeds of the sale, and where 
the proceeds have been exhausted by prior application to other 
categories, it is error to award attorney fees. See Florida 
First National Bank v. Fryd Construction Company, 240 So.2d 883 
POINT II. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW 
IN FAILING TO GRANT JUDGMENT TO APPELLANT 
IN THE AMOUNT OF $1,457.56, IT HAVING BEEN 
ESTABLISHED THAT U. & S. MOTOR COMPANY 
FAILED TO FOLLOW MANDATORY PROVISIONS OF 
LAW IN TkE REPOSSESSION AND SALE OF THE 
ROADRUNNER MOBILE HOME, AND FAILED TO 
PROPERLY APPLY AND DISTRIBUTE THE PROCEEDS 
OF THE SALE. 
As shown by Exhibit 1 in the record, on or about 
28 October 1971, Appellant BURNS signed a retail installment 
contract covering the purchase of a recreational trailer. The 
cash price was $4,540.00. A trade-in allowance of $1,000.00 
was involved. There was an unpaid balance of cash price in 
the amount of $3,540.00, physical damage insurance in the sum 
of $160.00, credit life insurance in the sum of $102.24, and a 
total unpaid balance of $3,802.24. The contract provided for 
a finance charge in the amount of $741.32. The total deferred 
payment price came to $5,543.56. See Exhibit 1, Record. 
Appellant BURNS defaulted on the contract, and U. & 
S. MOTOR COMPANY repossessed the trailer. Thereafter, without 
notice to Appellant, Respondent sold the trailer at secret 
private sale, in a commercially unreasonable manner, and appli 
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the proceeds of the sale in a manner not authorized by law, 
all as set forth in Point I above. For these reasons, and the 
following, Appellant is entitled to a reversal of the order of 
the lower court denying judgment to Appellant, and to a remand 
with instructions to the lower court to enter judgment for 
Appellant in the amount of $1,457.56. 
a. Utah law provides a remedy to a debtor where a 
creditor has failed to follow the statutory procedure for re-
possession and sale of collateral, and has failed to properly 
apply the proceeds of such sale. U.C.A. 70A-9-507(l) provides: 
"If it is established that the secured party 
is not proceeding in accordance with the 
provisions of this part disposition may be 
ordered or restrained on appropriate terms 
and conditions. If the disposition has 
occurred the debtor or any person entitled 
to notification or whose security interest 
has been made known to the secured party 
prior to the disposition has a right to 
recover from the secured party any loss 
caused by a failure to comply with the pro-
visions of this part. If the collateral is 
consumer goods, the debtor has a right to 
recover in any event an amount not less than 
the credit service charge plus ten per cent 
of the principal amount of the debt or the 
time price differential plus ten per cent of 
the cash price.11 (Emphasis supplied.) 
It can be readily seen that where a creditor fails to comply 
with the provisions of law governing the repossession and sale 
of collateral, and the subsequent application of proceeds, the 
debtor may recover his damages from the creditor. More import-
antly, where the collateral consists of consumer goods, the law 
provides a minimum rule of recovery for the debtor. See 
Comment 1 to Uniform Commercial Code, §9-507(1). 
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b. Utah law required that notice be sent to Appellant 
BURNS of the time, place, and manner of disposition of the 
trailer, and no such notice was sent. See I.a. supra, for dis-
cussion of Utah law concerning notice and the failure of U. & 
S. MOTOR COMPANY to send the same to Appellant. 
c. Utah law required that sale of the repossessed 
trailer be accomplished in a commercially reasonable manner, 
but the sale was made in a commercially unreasonable manner and 
Respondent failed to show the sale was commercially reasonable. 
See I.b. supra. 
d. Utah law established the priority of application 
of the proceeds from the sale of the trailer, and Respondent 
failed to so apply the proceeds, but applied them in a manner 
other than that provided by law. See I.e. supra, for analysis 
of Utah law concerning application of proceeds. 
e. The collateral in this case is consumer goods. 
U.C.A. 70A-9-109(l) states in part: 
"Goods are 'consumer goods1, if they are 
used or bought for use primarily for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes . . ." 
The record in this case is replete with references to the fact 
that Appellant BURNS purchased the Roadrunner trailer for his 
own personal and household purposes. Such being true, the 
trailer was consumer goods, and Appellant is entitled to the 
statutory minimum recovery allowed by reason of U. & S. MOTOR 
COMPANY'* failure to follow statutory procedure in the reposses 
sion, the sale of the trailer, and in the improper application 
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of proceeds. 
f. As a matter of law, Appellant GILBERT E. BURNS 
is and was entitled to Judgment against Respondent U. & S. 
MOTOR COMPANY, it having been established that Respondent 
failed to follow mandatory provisions of law in the reposses-
sion and sale of the Roadrunner recreational trailer, and in 
applying the proceeds of the sale. U.C.A. 70A-9-507(l) states 
in part, referring to a situation where disposition of consumer 
goods has occurred with the seller having failed to comply with 
statutory provisions concerning repossession, sale, and appli-
cation of proceeds, or has failed in any other manner to comply 
with appropriate provisions of law: 
lfIf the collateral is consumer goods, the 
debtor has a right to recover in any event 
an amount not less than the credit service 
charge plus ten per cent of the principal 
amount of the debt, or the time price dif-
ferential plus ten per cent of the cash 
price." 
Simple computations then establish Appellant's right to judgment 
in the amount of $1,457.56: 
Deferred payment price: $5,543.56 
Less cash price: 4,540.00 
Equals time price differential: $1,003 .56 
Plus ten per cent of cash price: 454.00 
Equals amount due to debtor: $1,457.56 
In addition to the statutory language cited, see 
Atlas Credit Corporation v. Dolbow, 193 Pa.Super. 649, 165 A.2d 704, 
where the Pennsylvania Court permitted recovery of damages under 
the rule pertaining to consumer goods where the creditor sold a 
repossessed boat without giving notice to the debtor. 
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CONCLUSION 
It appearing from the facts plainly apparent on the 
record that Respondent did not follow mandatory statutory pro-
cedure, or the procedure set forth by this Court in its previous 
Remittitur, in the repossession and sale of the Roadrunner 
trailer, but held a secret, private sale without giving notifi-
cation to Appellant of the time, place, and manner of sale, and 
it appearing that the proceeds of the sale were not applied as 
set forth by law, and that due to the failure of Respondent to 
follow mandatory procedure, the sale cannot be deemed to have 
been conducted in a commercially reasonable manner, and because 
of the oppressive and overreaching conduct of Respondent at all 
stages of the proceedings, the Judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed and remanded, with instructions to vacate 
the award of $473.13 attorney fees to Respondent, and to enter 
Judgment in favor of Appellant in the amount of $1,457.56. 
DATED: 16 August 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
MORRIS AND BISHOP 
Willard R. Bishop 
172 North Main Street 
P. 0. Box 279 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Attorneys for Defendant/Third-
Party Plaintiff/Appellant 
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